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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
James D. Kirk appeals from the judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a
minor under 16 and sexual battery of a minor child 16 or 17 years of age following a jury
trial. On appeal, Mr. Kirk asserts that he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair trial when the prosecuting attorney, in
her rebuttal closing, sang the first verse of the Confederate anthem Dixie in this
prosecution of a black man for alleged sex crimes against two female victims who
appeared to be white.
Mr. Kirk

the Idaho Supreme Court

this

prosecutorial misconduct that injects race into a criminal trial should

and hold that
treated as

structural error, requiring automatic reversal even when no contemporaneous objection
is made. Alternatively, although the error was not objected-to, Mr. Kirk maintains that it
satisfied the fundamental error test set forth by this Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209 (2010), such that it requires reversal and a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
James D. Kirk was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and sexual
battery of a minor child 16 or 17 years of age. (R., pp.19-20.) The charges against
Mr. Kirk arose from allegations that he had sex with two minor females: then-17 year old
J.C. and then-13 year old M.F.

(4/2/13 Tr., p.208, L.4 - p.210, L.12.) Both victims

1

to be white, 1 while Mr. Kirk is black. (Officer Report for Incident N12-30075,
13 (appended to

I); R., p.8; PSI, p.1.)

During the State's rebuttal closing, the prosecuting attorney opened her
argument as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, when I was a kid we used to like to sings [sic]
songs a lot. I always think of this one song. Some people know it It's the
Dixie song. Right? Oh, I wish I was in the land of cotton. Good times not
forgotten. Look away. Look away. Look away. And isn't that really what
you've kind of been asked to do? Look away from the two eyewitnesses.
Look away from the two victims. Look away from the nurse in her medical
opinion. Look away. Look away. Look away.
(4/4/13 Tr., p.187, L.25

p.i88, L.9.)

Defense counsel did not object.

(4/4/13

188, Ls.8-13.)
Dixie has long

considered the

facto national anthem of the Confederacy.

Charles Burleigh Galbreath, Daniel Decatur Emmett: Author of "Dixie" 20 n.1 (Press of
Fred J. Heer 1904); Bruce G. Kauffmann, 'Dixie' Quickly Became Confederate Anthem,
The Kentucky Post, April 4, 2005, at K4. Given its history, it is particularly loaded, and
"has come to symbolize everything wrong with race relations in the South." No more
Dixie, The Washington Times, July 31, 1999, at 11. "Dixie and the [Confederate battle]
flag became symbols of resistance to civil rights in Mississippi in 1948, the year
Mississippi was one of four states to support the Dixiecrat ticket on the national ballot."
Michael Kelley, Shadow of the Flag: Black Alumni of Ole Miss See Gradual Change, Yet
Frustrations, The Commercial Appeal, October 26,1997, at E1.

1 While the police reports for the incident list M.F.'s race as "w" (for white), M.F., in her
victim impact statement, wrote, "It is very hard for me to look at an African Amer- -African men the same way and also to trust people. I have always had a dream to meet
my birth father, but now I am super scared because he is African American." (6/7/13
Tr., p.321, Ls.1-5.)

2

Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Kirk on both counts, and he
unified
L.13

of twenty

with eight years fixed. (6/7/13 Tr., p.371,

p.372, L.3.) Mr. Kirk filed a timely Notice

3

Appeal. (R., p.217.)

ISSUE
Were Mr. Kirk's constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair trial
violated by the State's unobjected-to misconduct in singing the Confederate anthem
Dixie during closing arguments when Mr. Kirk, a black man, was on trial for alleged sex
crimes against two female victims who appeared to be white?

4

ARGUMENT
Mr. Kirk's Constitutional Rights To Due Process, Equal Protection, And A Fair Trial
Were Violated By The State's Unobiected-To Misconduct In Singing Dixie Duri!l9.
Closing Arguments When Mr. Kirk, A Black Man, VVas On Trial For Alleged Sex Crimes
Against Two Female Victims Who Appeared To Be White
A.

Introduction
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

that, "[n]o person

shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CON ST. amend. V.

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. 8mend.
XIV. The Idaho Constitution guarantees that, "[n]o person shall

... deprived of iife,

liberty or property without due process of law." 10. CONST. art. I, §1

It further provides,

"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal
protection and benefit .... " 10. CONST. art. I, § 2. Due process requires criminal trials
to be fundamentally fair.

Schwarlzmiller v.

Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).

Prosecutorial misconduct may result in the denial of a fair trial. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S.
756, 765 (1987).

In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that
"every defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right to due process" and "[iJt is
axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.'" Id. at
225 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). The Court went on to note,

[IJt is a violation of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial
for a prosecutor to attempt to have a jury reach its decision on any factor
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from that evidence.
Id. at 227.

5

During the State's rebuttal closing, the prosecuting attorney opened
ment as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, when I was a kid we used to like to sings [sic]
songs a lot. I always think of this one song. Some people know it. It's the
Dixie song. Right? Oh, I wish I was in the land of cotton. Good times not
forgotten. Look away. Look away. Look away. And isn't that really what
you've kind of been asked to do? Look away from the two eyewitnesses.
Look away from the two victims. Look away from the nurse in her medical
opinion. Look away. Look away. Look away.
(4/4/13 Tr., p.187, L.25- p.188, L.9.)
Mr. Kirk asserts that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she
the first verse of the Confederate anthem Dixie during her rebuttal closing
argument, most notably because it served to inject race into a case in which a black
man was charged with sex crimes against two female victims, both of whom appeared 2
to be white. In doing so, the prosecutor violated Mr. Kirk's due process rights to have
the case decided on the merits, equal protection, and a fair trial.
Mr. Kirk asserts that the proper way to treat claims of prosecutorial misconduct
involving the injection of race into a criminal trial is as structural error, requiring an
automatic reversal despite the lack of any contemporaneous objection. Alternatively, in
light of the historical significance of the song Dixie, which will be detailed infra, and the
nature of the charges and parties involved, the misconduct, while not objected to, rises
to the level of fundamental error necessitating reversal for a new trial.

2

See note 1.

6

B.

Mr. Kirk's Constitutional Rights To Due Process, Equal Protection, And A Fair
Trial Were Violated By The State's Unobjected-To Misconduct In Singing "Dixie"
During Closing Arguments When Mr. Kirk, A Black Man, Was On Trial For
Alleged Sex Crimes Against Two Female Victims Who Appeared To Be White

1.

The Historical Significance Of Dixie

According to a biography of Daniel Decatur Emmett, the man who wrote Dixie,
"[t]he circumstances under which Dixie became the war song of the Confederacy are
substantially as follows:"
In the spring of 1861, a spectacular performance was to be given in New
Orleans. The parts had all been agreed upon, except a song for the grand
chorus that should arouse enthusiasm and stir the Southern blood. Many
songs were suggested, but none proved entirely satisfactory. Dixie was
tried and given the place of honor. The great
that heard it was
thrilled. Encore followed encore in the midst of wild demonstrations of
approval. It then rapidly spread throughout the South and became the
rallying cry of the Confederacy.
Galbreath, supra, at 20 (footnote omitted).

Shortly after the above-described New

Orleans performance, at which the audience demanded seven encores, "The saloons,
the parlors, the streets rang with the 'Dixie' air, and 'Dixie' became to the South what
the 'Marseillaise'el is to France." Id. at 20 n.1 (internal citation omitted).
Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist created controversy when, at a judicial conference
in Virginia in 1999, he included Dixie in his annual "Old Fashioned Sing-along." Craig
Timberg, Rehnquist's Inclusion of 'Dixie' Strikes a Sour Note, Washington Post, July 22,
1999, at 81. The sing-along, which was led by Rehnquist, was held after dinner on the
first night of the conference, and as a result, "some African American lawyers say they
avoided the sing-along ... because of their distaste for 'Dixie,' which was a marching
song of Confederate troops during the Civil War and was played at Jefferson Davis's

Marseillaise, written in 1792, is the French national anthem.
REFERENCE DICTIONARY 885 (2d ed. 1996).

3
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inauguration as Confederate president in 1861." Id. '''Dixie' was penned by a 'blacksinger from the North

the Civil War. But with the opening line 'I wish I was

in the land of cotton,' it has become a racially charged symbol of Old Southern pride."
Id.

Author and historian Howard L. Sacks has explained, "Both the battle flag of the
Confederacy and 'Dixie' gained a racist cast to them as they were taken on by
segregationists." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Federal Judge U.W. Clemon
of Birmingham, who is African American, said the song 'symbolizes a determination to
keep things as they were, that is, to keep blacks in a subservient position.'"
president of the National
legal profession, explained,

Id. The

Association, "a group of 18,000 African Americans in
would be very, very troubled to learn that the chief

justice did that [led a sing-along that included Dixie]" because "[t]o us, that song is a
vestige of the badges of slavery."

Id.

While noting that "[m]isspellings and ethnic

pronunciations of words do not appear in most contemporary versions of the song," the
Washington Post article explained, "Its lyrics are in the stereotyped voice of African
Americans as they supposedly long for a return to plantation life and slavery." Id.
In Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972), the Sixth Circuit explained
some of the racial tensions aroused by the use of the Confederate battle flag and the
song Dixie at Brainerd High School, a formerly-segregated public school in Tennessee. 4
Prior to 1966, Brainerd was all-white, and "had adopted as its nickname the word
'Rebel' and used the Confederate flag as the school flag along with the song Dixie as its
pep song." Melton, 465 F.2d at 1333.

By the 1969 school year, "the student body

became racially polarized as a result of continuing controversy over the use of the

8

flag and the song Dixie at various school functions."

Id.

The school

and P.T.A. formed a committee that recommended "[a]s a corrective
measure ... that the use of the Confederate flag as a school symbol and the use of the
song Dixie as the school pep song be discontinued but that the nickname 'Rebel' be
retained." Consistent with the committee's recommendation, the school board adopted
a code provision that provided, "The song 'Dixie' can no longer be used as a fight or pep
song at Pep Meetings, Athletic contests or other school functions. It may be played in
concern when other music of similar kind composes the program." Id. at 1333-34.
Several music historians have described Dixie as being "synonymous with
slavery, racism and hatred."

Levin, 'Dixie' now too symbolic of old South, not of

origins, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 4, 1998, available
gazette.com/regionstate/19980904dixie4.asp.

http://old/post-

"Horace Clarence Boyer,

professor of music theory and African-American

music at the

a black

University of

Massachusetts at Amherst," has said that while "[s]ome songs have a broad
acceptance," Dixie is not among them. Id. Professor Boyer noted, "You don't have to
explain why you're playing 'The Star-Spangled Banner.' You don't have to explain why
you're playing 'America the Beautiful.' It has to be explained why somebody is playing
'Dixie' - unless it's the Ku Klux Klan." Id.

2.

Injection Of Race As Prosecutorial Misconduct

Appellate courts uniformly disapprove of the prosecutorial injection of race into
criminal trials, as misconduct in violation of the United States Constitution. See State v.
Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1241 (Haw. 1999) (,,[R]eferences to race that do not have an

The case itself concerned the propriety of disciplining a student for wearing a small
Confederate flag on his clothing. Melton, 465 F.2d at 1334.

4
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objectively legitimate purpose constitute a particularly
misconduct."); State v. Guthrie, 461

form of prosecutorial

163, 187 (W. Va. 1995) ("Appellate cou rts

give strict scrutiny to cases involving the alleged wrongful injection of race, gender, or
religion in criminal cases.

Where these issues are wrongfully injected, reversal is

usually the result.") (citations omitted); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 n. 30
(1987) ('The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.") (citation
omitted). The law is clear and well-established: prosecutorial appeals to race violate the
United States Constitution.
Even "subtle, indirect, or veiled" appeals to race constitute prosecutorial
misconduct. Explaining

decision to reverse a murder conviction on the basis of race-

prosecutorial misconduct in which the prosecutor essentially accused defense
counsel of using code words to refer to African-American witnesses, the Minnesota

Supreme Court explained,
Bias often surfaces indirectly or inadvertently and can be difficult to detect.
We emphasize, nonetheless, that the improper injection of race "can affect
a juror's impartiality and must be removed from courtroom proceedings to
the fullest extent possible." Affirming this conviction would undermine our
strong commitment to rooting out bias, no matter how subtle, indirect, or
veiled.
State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W. 2d 469, 475 (Minn. 2005) (internal citation omitted).

In McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit
considered the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought "on the ground
that his constitutional rights were denied by the prosecutor's inclusion of improper racist
remarks in the summation." McFarland, 611 F.2d at 415. The petitioner was convicted
of selling heroin following a trial at which "the State's case depended almost entirely on
the testimony of Patricia Dorman, a Rochester undercover police officer." Id. Officer
Dorman testified that she purchased $450 worth of heroin from the petitioner, whom she
10

knew from high school and had seen on occasion since then,
Id.

an apartment building.

The defense presented testimony from a friend of the petitioner that he and the

petitioner had gone to the apartment building to meet two prostitutes, who never
showed up, and that he saw Officer Dorman in the company of two Puerto Rican men
before she left the building without interacting with the petitioner. Id.
In closing, the prosecutor argued that the jury should consider whether Officer
Dorman, an African-American woman, would lie about "a member of her own race. You
use your common sense to think about that." Id. at 416. In rejecting the State's attempt
to uphold the conviction because the prosecutor's statements were not the "racial slurs"
found to

inappropriate in United States ex reI. Haynes v. McKendrick,481 F.2d 1

(2d Cir. 1973), the court explained,
Neither Haynes nor the lines of authority on which it drew set the
constitutional limits for improper prosecution argument at racial slurs.
Race is an impermissible basis for any adverse governmental action in the
absence of compelling justification. When a prosecutor's summation
includes racial remarks in an effort to persuade a jury to return a guilty
verdict, the resulting conviction is constitutionally unfair unless the
remarks are abundantly justified. To raise the issue of race is to draw the
jury's attention to a characteristic that the Constitution generally
commands us to ignore. Even a reference that is not derogatory may
carry impermissible connotations, or may trigger prejudiced responses in
the listeners that the speaker might neither have predicted nor intended .
. . . But given the general requirement that the race of a criminal defendant
must not be the basis of any adverse inference, any reference to it by a
prosecutor must be justified by a compelling state interest.
Id. at 416-17 (emphasis added).
The Sixth Circuit has explained, "Appeals to racial prejudice [by prosecutors] are
foul blows and the courts of this country reject them." United States
1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 1970).

V.

Grey, 422 F.2d

In Grey, a bank robbery prosecution, the United States

Attorney asked a character witness for Grey "whether he knew that Grey, a Negro, and
11

a married man, was 'running around with a white

go~go

dancer.'" Id.

1044-45.

objection was overruled and a motion for mistrial was denied. Id. at 1045. The court
could "find no nonprejudicial explanation for the 'white go-go dancer' question asked by
the United States Attomey," and explained, "At

the entire question was a

magnificent irrelevance in a prosecution for bank robbery ... At worst, the gratuitous
reference to the race of the go-go dancer may be read as a deliberate attempt to
employ racial prejudice to strengthen the hand of the United States government." Id. In
reversing, the court explained, "Where, as here, the facts are such as to indicate that
such prejudicial tactics may have had a substantial influence upon the result of
for new trial is ordered." Id.

1046 (citations omitted).

In Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1978), the
considered whether a prosecutor's

trial,

unobjected~to

Circuit

comments in a rape case involving

black defendants and a white alleged victim required that the convictions be vacated.
The court began by noting, "A prejudicial argument by the prosecutor poses a serious
threat to a fair tria!."

Miller, 583 F.2d at 706.

The court cited to Judge Frank's

"trenchant" dissent in United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1946), a wartime prosecution in which the prosecutor made appeals to patriotism, to
demonstrate "why such arguments are so objectionable." Id. The Fourth Circuit quoted
the following from Judge Frank's dissent:
A jury trial, at best, is chancy. "Mr. Prejudice and Miss Sympathy are the
names of witnesses whose testimony is not recorded, but must
nevertheless be reckoned with * * *"; and most jurors have no trained
capacity for doing so. A keen observer has said that "next to perjury,
prejudice is the main cause of miscarriages of justice." If government
counsel in a criminal suit is allowed to inflame the jurors by irrelevantly
arousing their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands a
lethal weapon directed against defendants who may be innocent. He
should not be permitted to summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice. Law
suits, do what we will, are hazardous: A missing witness, a lost document
12

these and numerous other fortuitous factors may result in a man's losing
his life, liberty or property unjustly. When the government puts a citizen to
the hazards of a criminal jury trial, a government attorney should not
allowed to increase those hazards unfairly.
155 F.2d at 658-59 (citations omitted).
Miller, 583 F.2d at 706 n.7.

Discussing the perils of racially prejudicial comments in sex crime prosecutions,
the court cautioned, "Concern about fairness should be especially acute where a
prosecutor's argument appeals to race prejudice in the context of a sexual crime, for
few forms of prejudice are so virulent.,,5 Id. at 707. The court went on to explain, "one
of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is

eradication of racial considerations

from criminal proceedings." Id. (citation omitted).
In this prosecution of a black man for alleged sex crimes committed against two
female victims who were - or appeared to be - white, the prosecutor sang the de facto
national anthem of the Confederacy.

Doing so impermissibly injected racial

considerations into the type of case in which the Miller Court cautioned concerns about
fairness should of the utmost importance given the "virulent" prejudice against interracial
relationships that have long existed in this nation, and the fact that such prejudice is still
openly advocated, as the Ian Johnson proposal threats show.

In light of this, the

5 It is likely that courts take the injection of race into sex crime prosecutions so seriously
because it has been less than 50 years since the United States Supreme Court struck
down anti-miscegenation laws in sixteen states. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). In the fifteen years preceding Loving, Idaho and thirteen other states finally
repealed laws banning interracial marriage. Id. at 6 n. 5. As recently as 2007, Boise
State's Ian Johnson received dozens of calls, letters, and "personal threats" after he
proposed to his white girlfriend on national television after scoring the winning two-point
conversion in the Fiesta Bowl. Boise State's Johnson receives racial threats, The
Seattle Times, July 25, 2007, at D3.
13

racial

into the prosecution

Mr. Kirk

especially heinous

This Court Should Hold That The Unobjected-To Injection Of Race Into A
Criminal Trial By The State Constitutes Structural Error, Requiring
Automatic Reversal, Or At The Very Least, Shift The Burden Of Proving
Harmlessness To The State
Racial prejudice can violently affect a juror's impartiality and must be
removed from the courtroom proceeding to the fullest extent possible. It
negates the defendant's right to be tried on the evidence in the case and
not on extraneous issues. More than just harm to the individual defendant
is involved, however. For the introduction of racial prejudice into a trial
helps further embed the already too deep impression in public
consciousness that there are two standards of justice in the United
one for
and the other for blacks. Such an appearance of duality in
our racially troubled times is, quite simply, intolerable from the standpoint
of the future of our society.
United States ex

Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1973) (citations

omitted).
The Conference of Chief Justices has found that, "despite significant progress in
combating racial and ethnic prejudice in the United States, such bias persists in society,
including government institutions, the courts and the justice system," "sizeable
segments of society continue to believe that minorities are treated unfairly by the courts
and that racial and ethnic prejudice impedes fair and equal access to the courts .... "
Conference of Chief Justices, Policy Statements and Resolutions, Resolution No. 28
(Aug. 1, 2002).6 Further, because "bias, either actual or perceived, cannot be tolerated
by the courts ... the courts have an important responsibility to take the lead role in
eliminating racial and ethnic bias in the courts and throughout the entire justice system .
. . ." Id.

Available at http://ccj.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resoluti ons/08012002-lnSupport-of-State-Courts-Responsibility-to-Address-Issues-of-Racial-and-Ethnic.ashx.
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to

public perception, especially among racial minorities, that the criminal

system is not colorblind,? along with the sensitive nature of racial issues in this
nation's history, Mr. Kirk asserts that a strong standard of review must be adopted when
considering prosecutorial misconduct involving the injection of race into a criminal
prosecution. See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 558 (Wash. 2011) (such misconduct
"fundamentally undermines the principle of equal justice and is so repugnant to the
concept of an impartial trial its very existence demands that appellate courts set
appropriate standards to deter such conduct").
Not only is such a standard necessary to protect the individual criminal
defendant, but also to

the public's belief in the integrity of the justice system. To

allow even the perception that race has played a factor in obtaining a criminal conviction
when it is wholly-irrelevant to the case undermines the integrity of the entire criminal
justice system. 8 Allowing for the chance that race played a role in a criminal conviction
violates a defendant's rights to a fair trial and equal protection.
While he asserts that this Court should find such unobjected-to misconduct to be
structural error, necessitating automatic reversal, he alternatively argues that this Court

A survey conducted in 2000 led the authors of a report for the National Center for
State Courts to conclude that "[p]erceptions of fairness differ sharply by race and
ethnicity. For example, among recent court users, nearly half of Whites (49 percet), just
over one-seventh of African-Americans (15 percent), and four out of ten Latinos (40
percent) believe that court outcomes are always or usually fair. It is striking that twice
as many African-Americans believe that outcomes are seldom or never fair as believe
they are always or usually fair." David B. Rottman & Randall M. Hansen, How Recent
Court Users View the State Courts: Perceptions of Whites, African-Americans, and
Latinos
5
(National
Center
for
State
Courts
2003),
available
at
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getdownloaditem/collection/ctcomm/id/18/filen
ame/19.pdf.
8 Obviously, in some cases, namely hate crimes, racial issues will not only be relevant
but, of necessity, playa central role. Mr. Kirk's case is not such a case.
7
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require the State to show

a reasonable doubt even when

no contemporaneous objection
Neither the Idaho appellate courts nor the United States Supreme Court has yet
considered whether the injection of race into a criminal trial constitutes structural error,
requiring automatic reversal. Two appellate courts have dispensed with the harmless
error test when dealing with prosecutorial misconduct involving race, holding that it
constitutes structural error and requires automatic reversal. See Miller, 583 F.2d at 708;
Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 614-15 (Del. 1988) ("[T]he right to a fair trial that is

of improper racial implications is so basic to the federal Constitution that an
upon that right can never be
noted, the United States

harmless error.") (citing Miller).

Court

to rule on the

Calhoun v. United

States, 133 S.Ct. 1136 (Mem.) (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of cert.) ("Yet

in his petition for writ of certiorari, Calhoun ... contends that the comment should lead
to automatic reversal because it constitutes either structural error or plain error
regardless of whether it prejudiced the outcome.

Those arguments, however, were

forfeited when Calhoun failed to press them on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.").
The United States Supreme Court has explained that structural errors "defy
analysis by harmless error standards" because they have "consequences that are
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate." United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. 140, 148-49 (2006) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).

Explaining its

conclusion that the denial of the Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel of choice is
structural error, the Supreme Court reasoned, "Harmless-error analysis in such a
context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an altemate
universe." Id. at 150.
16

The Miller Court explained why it was foregoing the harmless error test, and
treating the injection of race into a criminal trial as structural error, as follows:
Where the jury is exposed to highly prejudicial argument by the
prosecutor's calculated resort to racial prejudice on an issue as sensitive
as consent to sexual intercourse in a prosecution for rape, we think that
the prejudice engendered is so great that automatic reversal is required.
In such a case, the impartiality of the jury as a fact-finder is fatally
compromised.
Because that contamination may affect the jury's
evaluation of all of the evidence before it, speculation about the effect of
the error on the verdict is fruitless. Reversal must be automatic.
Miller, 583 F.2d at 708 (citations omitted).

Given the fact that, in Mr. Kirk's case, when thirty-four members of the jury panel
were surveyed by defense counsel, eighteen agreed that "society still uses race as a
potential factor in certain decisions that are

" while

"that we as a

society have moved past the fact that race is a factor in any kind of decision-making"
(4/2/13 Tr., p.148, L.1 - p.150, L.9), it is obvious that the injection of race into a criminal

trial is the sort of "unquantifiable and indeterminate" error for which harmless error
review is impossible.

It would require "a speculative inquiry into what might have

occurred in an alternate universe" to conduct a harmless error analysis when the
prosecutor has injected racial considerations into a criminal prosecution. In light of the
impossibility of assessing the impact that the injection of race into a criminal trial has via
harmless error analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court should hold that such error is
structural, requiring automatic reversal.
In the alternative to his argument that this Court should hold that the unobjectedto injection of race into a criminal trial is structural error, Mr. Kirk respectfully requests
that this Court place the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt on
the State. As will be discussed infra, a number of appellate courts have adopted this
approach when reviewing unobjected-to misconduct that injects race into a criminal trial.
17

Although the Washington Supreme Court recently declined to dispense with the
error analysis on this issue, it has held that when

unobjected-to

prosecutorial misconduct in which "a prosecutor flagrantly or apparently intentionally
appeals to racial bias in a way that undermines the defendant's credibility or the
presumption of innocence, we will vacate the conviction unless it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not affect the jury's verdict," and that "in such
cases, the burden is on the State." Monday, 257 P.3d at 558 (footnote omitted).
In United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990), a case in which the
prosecutor made unobjected-to references to "Jamaicans" dominating the crack cocaine
in Washington,

, the court held that "the Government has the burden of

establishing that it [the misconduct] was harmless" beyond a reasonable doubt. Doe,
903 F.2d at 27-28.

In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "prosecutorial

remarks kindling racial or ethnic predilections 'can violently affect a juror's impartiality' ..
. Just how much influence the prosecutor's summation exerted upon the jury is, of
course, incapable of precise measurement, but its portent for harm is ominous." Id. at
28 (citations and footnotes omitted).
If this Court is unwilling to accept Mr. Kirk's invitation to find that the unobjectedto injection of race into a criminal trial is structural error, requiring automatic reversal, he
respectfully requests that it modify the typical test for unobjected-to error, and require
the State to establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the misconduct was race-based, this Court should automatically
reverse, as such misconduct constitutes structural error. Alternatively, this Court should
shift the burden for such unobjected-to misconduct to the State to establish
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. In either case, this Court should vacate the
18

judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial

which racial

play no

Even If This Court Declines Mr. Kirk's Request For A Different Standard Of
Review, The Prosecutor's Injection Of Race Into This Case Constituted
Unconstitutional Misconduct Necessitating Reversal Under The Perry Test
Mr. Kirk asserts that, regardless of how subtle 9 or blatant, the injection of race as
a consideration at a criminal trial violates a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due
process right to a fair trial, which includes a decision based solely on the law and
evidence, and his right to equal protection, especially when the case involves a
for sex crimes in which the defendant is black and the alleged victims
or

to

white.

If this Court declines Mr. Kirk's

that it

prosecutorial misconduct that improperly injects race into a criminal trial as structural
error, or shifts the burden of showing harmlessness to the State, he maintains that the
error was nevertheless reversible under Perry.
The standard of review for unobjected to error as set forth by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Perry is as follows:
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and
remand.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.

"Not all appeals to racial prejudice are blatant. Perhaps more effective but just as
insidious are subtle references. Like wolves in sheep's clothing, a careful word here
and there can trigger racial bias." Monday, 257 P.3d at 557 (citations omitted).
9
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a.

The Error Violated One Or More Of Mr. Kirk's Unwaived Constitutional
Rights

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides, "No State shall.
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

U.S.

CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1. The government's improper injection of race into a criminal
trial violates a defendant's right to equal protection. See McKendrick, 481 F.2d at 159
(explaining that "where a criminal trial is affected by racial prejudice, either in the
underlying procedure, the atmosphere surrounding the trial or otherwise" is "the point
where the due process and equal protection clauses overlap or
omitted); Withers v. United
convictions due to prosecutor's

least meet") (footnote

602 F.2d 124, 127 (6th Cir. 1979) (vacating
of race in closing argument, and explaining that

its opinion "requires that it [the prosecution] be accomplished under equal protection of
the law").
[I]t is a violation of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial
for a prosecutor to attempt to have a jury reach its decision on any factor
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from that evidence.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
b.

The Error Is Plain

The second prong of the Perry analysis for unobjected-to fundamental error is
whether the error was plain on the face of the record. In this case, for the reasons set
forth in subsection 8(1), which recounts the historical significance and modern reactions
to Dixie, as well as the races - or perceived races - of Mr. Kirk and the alleged victims,
the error in a prosecutor singing the de facto national anthem of the Confederacy, in a
sex crime prosecution is plain.
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c.
The third prong of the

analysis is whether the defendant can show that the

error was not harmless. As noted in subsection 8(3), in support of the argument for the
adoption of a different standard for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct in improperly
injecting race into a criminal trial, the sensitivity of race relations in this nation makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to determine what effect racial considerations play in trial.
With that said, the fol/owing analysis provides a basis for concluding that the
prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and should
lead this Court to conclude that it is impossible to say that the misconduct did not, in
some way, contribute to the verdict.
In this case, the jury was

a rendition of the Confederacy's de facto

national anthem, Dixie, which, as discussed in detail supra, was adopted by
segregationists in the 20 th century, and is written in the voice of a former slave pining for
the "good old days" when he was a slave, picking cotton in the South. Given the subject
matter of the song, the nature of the criminal charges against Mr. Kirk, and the uniform
condemnation of even subtle appeals to racial bias by countless appellate courts
because of the difficulty in assessing its impact, Mr. Kirk asserts that the prosecutor's
misconduct in violation of his due process right to a fair trial at which his guilt or
innocence was determined solely on the law and evidence and his right to equal
protection, cannot be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to the equal protection argument, the prosecutor's singing of Dixie
could only have had an impact in a case in which the defendant was black, and such an
impact is even stronger when the alleged crimes are of a sexual nature and the alleged
victims are - or appear to be - white.

See Miller, 583 F.2d at 707 ("Concern about
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should be especially acute where a prosecutor's argument appeals to race
prejudice in the context of a sexual crime, for

forms of

are so virulent.");

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U . 545, 554-55 (1979) ("Discrimination on account of race was

the primary evil at which the Amendments adopted after the War

H.QlrlAJQ

the States,

including the Fourteenth Amendment, were aimed. The Equal Protection Clause was
central to the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of discriminatory action by the State .
. . Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in aU aspects, is especially pernicious in
the administration of justice.").
As for the due process argument, the singing of such an offensive, raciallycharged

subtly

and

decide the case not on the merits, but on the

into the

inviting the jury to

of race.

(reversing a

conviction because the prosecutor asked a single question about the married, black
defendant purportedly "running around with a white go-go dancer"); Cabrera, 700 N.W.
2d at 475 ("Affirming this conviction would undermine our strong commitment to rooting
out bias, no matter how subtle, indirect, or veiled.").
The prosecutor's subtle injection of racial bias into this sex crime prosecution of a
black defendant for alleged offenses committed against female victims who were - or
appeared to be - white violated Mr. Kirk's unwaived rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The error was plain on the
face of the record, and it cannot be said that the conduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and did not contribute to the verdict in this case because of the nature
of the misconduct and the races - or perceived races - of Mr. Kirk and the alleged
victims. As such, even if this Court declines Mr. Kirk's request for a strict standard with
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respect to

type of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, his convictions must be

vacated under the

test for unobjected-to error.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Kirk respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial at which race
is not improperly injected into the proceedings and at which his constitutional rights to
due process, a fair trial, and equal protection are respected.
DATED this 9 th day of May, 2014.

J. HAHN
Appellate Public
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